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Notes
MISSING THE MARK: THE SEARCH FOR AN
EFFECTIVE CLASS CERTIFICATION PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Class certification is one of the most hotly contested issues in class
action litigation today due to the fact that virtually all certified classes
settle their claims.1 In class actions brought under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) (“Rule 23(b)(3)”), the general rule is that after a
federal court finds a class untenable, members of the alleged class that
were not named in the original proceedings are free to certify the class in
a different jurisdiction.2 Defendants cannot argue collateral estoppel
against these absent class members because the absent class members
did not have a chance to litigate the certification issue in the original
proceeding.3 In fact, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re General
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation,4 held
that it had no power over putative class members5 in a Rule 23(b)(3)
action because it had not afforded the class due process.6 However, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires

1
See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 143 (1996) (noting that in the federal districts surveyed,
between 62% and 100% of the certified class actions settled, while in other cases, between
20% and 30% settled); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 289 (2003) (stating that class actions do not usually go to
trial but end in settlements that are really an elaborate set of new rights for the class
members in relation to the defendants).
2
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod.,
134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter GM Trucks II]. This Note deals exclusively
with attempts to certify classes under Rule 23(b)(3) and does not discuss Rule 23(b)(1) or
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, although much of the reasoning may apply to those classes. See
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). Further, this Note recognizes that plaintiffs’ pleadings may
contain allegations that a class fits into more than one category, or the class may be denied
for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a). See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the general requirements for certification under Rule 23(a).
However, this Note addresses any situation in which it is pled that the class is certifiable
under Rule 23(b)(3).
3
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
4
134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
5
A “putative class member” is a member of an alleged or supposed class for which the
plaintiff is seeking certification. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 574 (2d Pocket Ed.
2001).
6
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141.
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Products Liability Litigation,7 recently held that it could exercise power
over the entire putative class.8 This finding allowed the court to use its
power under the All Writs Act9 to enjoin the entire putative class from
additional certification attempts.10 The court also held that this situation
fell within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which generally
prevents federal courts from staying pending state court litigation. 11
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling solved some of the problems associated
with allowing numerous certification attempts by putative class
members.12 However, it did not afford due process to the putative class
before enjoining it.13 Traditionally, in order to bind someone in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action, due process requires adequate representation,
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to request exclusion
from the class.14 However, the Seventh Circuit found power to bind an
entire putative class based only on adequate representation.15
The tension between the divergent approaches taken by the Third
Circuit and Seventh Circuit is illustrated by the following hypothetical.16
Assume that StarBrothers, Inc. has marketed a defective table saw that
injures users in all fifty states. Albert, one of the injured users of the
product, attempts to have a nationwide class certified against
StarBrothers in federal court, but his motion to certify is denied because
the nationwide class was not proper. Although StarBrothers used many
resources litigating this issue and was successful in doing so, its battle
would not be over. Other product users that were not involved in the
first action could bring subsequent actions in different jurisdictions to try
to get the class certified, and StarBrothers would have no basis to argue
collateral estoppel because these new plaintiffs were absent from the
original proceedings.17 Therefore, StarBrothers would be forced to
litigate the class certification issue again. Certification attempts could
333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Bridgestone/Firestone].
Id. at 769.
9
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); see infra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Act.
10
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
11
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see infra notes 189-94, 216-18 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Act.
12
See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.
13
See infra Part III.B, IV.B.2.
14
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
15
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
16
This hypothetical is fictional and was created by the author for the purpose of
illustration.
17
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
7
8
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continue as long as there were willing plaintiffs and proper forums.
Further, if another court certifies the same class rejected by the federal
court, the federal court’s decision to deny class certification is rendered
meaningless.18
Alternatively, StarBrothers could ask the federal court to enjoin the
other injured consumers from attempting to certify the class using its
power under the All Writs Act.19 Using the Third Circuit’s approach, an
exercise of power over those not previously before the court would be
improper.20 However, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the court
could prevent all the injured persons from attempting to certify the class
in another forum based merely on finding that their interests were
adequately represented by the named plaintiffs.21 Under this approach,
the court could even withhold notice and the opportunity to be heard
from those being enjoined.22
Typically when a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), due process
requires that absent class members be given adequate representation,
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to request exclusion
from the class in order to bind the absent members by the judgment.23
When applying this standard to members of putative classes after
certification has been denied, both the Third Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit failed to come to an appropriate result.24 By examining the
history of binding out-of-state defendants and absent class members, this
Note will demonstrate that there is power to bind putative class
members only when notice, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate
representation are given.25

18
See infra Part IV.A, which discusses this issue and other problems associated with
repeated certification attempts.
19
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); see infra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this Act.
20
See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
21
See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 768-769 (7th Cir. 2003). In this hypothetical,
the absent class members filed their actions after the federal court had decided the
certification issue. However, if the actions were concurrent with the federal court action,
the Anti-Injunction Act would prevent the federal court from enjoining the state court
proceedings. See infra notes 189-94, 216-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
circuit split regarding whether this situation fits into one of the exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act.
22
See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the due process implications of this method.
23
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
24
See infra Part IV.
25
See infra Part III.B.2.
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Part II of this Note first discusses traditional personal jurisdiction,
followed by the bases for gaining power over absent class members in
the absence of personal jurisdiction, with an emphasis on what due
process protections are required.26 Part III describes the current circuit
split regarding whether there is power to bind members of putative
classes after a court denies certification.27 The Third Circuit effectively
refused to exercise power over the putative class by requiring the right to
opt out to be given.28 However, the Seventh Circuit exercised its
injunctive power based solely on a showing of adequate representation.29
Part IV describes the problems associated with both of these approaches
and attempts to find an appropriate balance of the competing interests.30
Part V proposes an amendment to Rule 23(c) which would allow federal
courts to enjoin the putative class members from further attempts to
certify the same class found untenable by a federal court.31 However, the
basis for this power must come by providing putative class members
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.32 The
proposed change to Rule 23(c) would require merely the best notice
practicable and not individual notice.33 Additionally, because the
defendant is put into the plaintiff’s position when seeking an injunction,
courts should have the power to require the defendant to reimburse the
plaintiff for the costs of notice if an injunction is issued.34
II. POWER TO BIND ABSENT MEMBERS OF CERTIFIED RULE 23(B)(3) CLASSES
Generally, in order to be bound by a judgment, one must be subject
to personal jurisdiction and served with process.35 However, both Rule
23 and Supreme Court jurisprudence create an exception to this rule for
absent class members in class actions.36 This exception is applicable to
members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes when notice, an opportunity to be
heard, the right to request exclusion from the class (“opt out”), and
adequate representation are afforded.37 However, even in the absence of

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
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See infra Part III.
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra notes 39, 44 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.1-2.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
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these due process protections, absent class members may still be treated
as parties for some procedural events.38
A. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction
Generally, due process requires that a court have personal
jurisdiction over a person in order to bind him to a decision.39 The
Supreme Court created an elaborate set of rules for determining when
personal jurisdiction exists.40 Additionally, in order for a state court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, there must
be power to do so conferred by statute, typically referred to as a longarm statute.41 Long-arm statutes either enumerate acts that give courts
jurisdiction or allow any exercise of jurisdiction consistent with due
process.42 A federal court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction is
determined by the same inquiry as that of the state courts in which the
federal court sits.43 Finally, due process requires that notice be given to
the party over whom the court will exercise power in order to perfect the
jurisdiction.44

See infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877) for the proposition that “[a] judgment rendered
in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and
credit elsewhere”). The requirement of personal jurisdiction is a liberty interest derived
from the Due Process Clause, and thus, it can be waived. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982).
40
See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732.
41
See, e.g., Eric D. Anderson, The Long Reach of Illinois’ Long-Arm Statute: The Catch-All
Provision, 84 ILL. B.J. 504, 504 (Oct. 1996) (comparing the long-arm statutes of several states).
42
Compare Joshua S. Bauchner, New York’s Long Arm Statute Contains Provisions Suitable
for Jurisdiction over Web Sites, 72 N.Y. ST B.A.J. (Mar.-Apr. 2000) (citing Beacon Enters. Inc. v.
Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 764 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983) for the proposition that New York’s long-arm
statute does not extend to the limits of due process) with Connie M. Ericson, Casenote
CMMC v. Salinas: The Texas Long-Arm Statute Does Not Reach French Equipment
Manufacturer (But Maybe It Should), 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 493, 496 n.22 (1998) (citing
Helicopteros Nactionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1984) for the
proposition that the Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of due
process).
43
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Service of a summons . . . is effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant (A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of
a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located.”). But see
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B), (C), and (D) (providing exceptions to the general rule for those
joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and served in the United States within one hundred miles
of where the summons was issued, those subject to federal interpleader jurisdiction, or
when authorized by a federal statute).
44
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950)). Ineffective service will prevent a court from gaining personal
38
39
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Originally, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 45 the Supreme Court held that due
process required a party to be present within the borders of a state in
order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over the party.46 This
notion of territoriality was driven by ideas of state sovereignty, and it
dominated the personal jurisdiction doctrine for almost seventy-five
years, forcing courts to engage in intellectual gymnastics in order to
reach equitable results.47 Many exceptions to the territoriality-based
Pennoyer rules existed, including some recognized by the Pennoyer Court
itself.48 Other courts created exceptions, including the implied consent
fiction.49 A classic example of courts using the implied consent fiction
jurisdiction. See Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transactional Class Actions
and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 47 (2003); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (listing the
notice requirements to be used in federal court proceedings).
45
95 U.S. at 714.
46
Id. at 733 (stating that in order to have a valid judgment in personam, power must be
exerted over the defendant by service of process in the state or by voluntary appearance).
47
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977) (discussing the rigidity of the
territoriality-based Pennoyer approach).
48
One exception recognized in Pennoyer was that of in rem jurisdiction. 95 U.S. at 724.
(stating that if someone had property within a state, and the property was attached in
accordance with local law, he could be bound by a judgment only to the extent of the
property involved). However, the Supreme Court later came to rethink its in rem analysis.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (reasoning that it can no longer accept the fiction that in rem
jurisdiction is merely an assertion of power over the property, and not over the person, and
thus “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny”). A second exception recognized in Pennoyer
is that a state has the power to adjudicate the status of a resident, such as in a divorce case,
in which the defendant is a non-resident. 95 U.S. at 734-35; see Allan R. Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 696
(1987) (arguing that this meant a state’s courts always had power over residents, even
when they were not present). A third exception was that a state may require non-residents
that enter into partnerships or contracts within the state to appoint an agent within the
state for service of process or a place in which service may be left, and if they do not, the
state may designate a public officer for that purpose. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735. The final
exception recognized in Pennoyer was that a corporation, by doing business in a state,
consented to suit in that state. Id.; see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 202 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) for the proposition that this exception was expanded by the
idea that corporations doing business in a state were considered “present” in the state). It
became clear, however, that courts were really attempting to determine if it was fair to
exercise jurisdiction over these corporations. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
49
See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03
(1982) (stating that personal jurisdiction is a waivable due process right each individual
possesses, and thus, “[a] variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express
or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court”). The Court went on to list a
number of instances in which consent to jurisdiction was found. Id. at 704; see Nat’l Equip.
Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (stating that a contract may, by its terms, bind
parties to jurisdiction); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (finding plaintiffs
consented to cross-claims by bringing action); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882)
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involved an out-of-state motorist who the Supreme Court held
consented to the appointment of a state official as his agent for service of
process in civil actions merely because he operated his car on the state’s
roads.50
In 1945, the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington51
released itself from the territoriality-based Pennoyer approach and
moved to a standard based on reasonableness.52 In International Shoe, the
Court declared that in order to gain personal jurisdiction over a
defendant not present in the forum state, “due process requires only that
. . . he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”53 This standard protects defendants from the
burden of litigating in a distant forum and ensures that states do not
infringe on the sovereignty of other states.54
The Supreme Court subsequently elaborated on the minimum
contacts test.55 In the minimum contacts test, the initial inquiry is
whether there has been some act by which the defendant purposely
availed himself of “the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws.”56
In conducting this inquiry, the court must consider whether the
(holding that a state could infer consent from a business that registers to conduct business
in the state); Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding consent in an arbitration agreement). But see
Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) (stating that jurisdiction gained
in this way is not based on consent at all, for the party could protest to all ends and still be
subject to jurisdiction); Stein, supra note 48, at 696 (“No one really believed this fiction—
clearly the defendant’s ‘consent’ was either coerced or unintended—but the fiction was
essential to the maintenance of the Pennoyer framework.”).
50
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927).
51
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52
Id. at 317; see Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1985) (noting that technological
progress has allowed for increased interstate commerce and better communications and
transportation, which make it easier for defendants to defend in foreign states and have
forced the requirements for personal jurisdiction to move from the rigid Pennoyer paradigm
to the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe).
53
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Due
process does not allow for a binding judgment in personam against a defendant with no
contacts, ties, or relations to the state. Id. at 319.
54
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
55
Bassett, supra note 44, at 52 (stating that there is no consistent, comprehensive way to
determine if minimum contacts exist and that the Supreme Court has essentially decided
the issue case by case).
56
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see Asahi Metal Indus., Co. v. Sup. Ct. of California, 480 U.S.
102, 108-09 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); McGee v. Int’l
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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defendant can reasonably foresee being sued in the forum state.57 Once a
court has established that there has been purposeful availment, it must
determine whether it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction, or in other
words, if it would be consistent with traditional notions of “fair play and
substantial justice.”58 This reasonableness inquiry entails considering
many factors, including the burden placed on the defendant, the state’s
interest in adjudicating the claim and providing its citizens with relief,
the plaintiff’s interests, and judicial efficiency.59
Additionally, notice of a pending action is necessary to perfect
personal jurisdiction and inform those who will be deprived of their life,
liberty, or property by that action.60 The Supreme Court, in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,61 held that notice reasonably calculated
under the circumstances to alert the interested parties and give them an
opportunity to present objections is an “elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process.”62 Thus, in order to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, he must receive service of process that is
reasonably calculated to reach him.63 This means that defendants may

57
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-96 (rejecting the argument that a consumer
unilaterally acting to bring a product produced by the defendant into the forum state is
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction). Although the Court has stated that a defendant
placing a product into the stream of commerce and foreseeing that it will reach the forum
will not create purposeful availment, that part of the decision was a 4-4 split with no
precedental value. See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion). Therefore, the
many decisions taking an opposing view still are good law. See, e.g., Bean Dredging Corp.
v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984).
58
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; see Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 114 (finding jurisdiction
unreasonable based on the burden it would have placed on the defendant).
59
Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113; see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74 (stating that if
there is purposeful availment, “it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to
account in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities”);
Kulko v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 (1978) (stating that the plaintiff’s interest in
gaining effective relief and the interest in judicial economy must also be considered);
McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (noting that the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute
must be considered in determining whether there are minimum contacts).
60
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
62
Id. Whether or not a type of notice is constitutional may depend on if it is “reasonably
certain to inform those affected . . . or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other
of the feasible and customary substitutes.” Id. at 315.
63
See Bassett, supra note 44, at 82 n.31 (citing Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946)).
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be bound by a judgment without actually receiving notice if it was
reasonably calculated to reach them.64
Absent class members in class actions usually lack minimum
contacts with the forum state, and thus courts do not have personal
jurisdiction over them.65 However, class actions can still go forward
because there is no need for a court to have personal jurisdiction over an
absent class member in order to bind him to a judgment.66 Rule 23 and
Supreme Court jurisprudence offer the basis for this exercise of power in
the absence of traditional personal jurisdiction.67
B. Gaining Power over Absent Class Members in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions
1.

Rule 23 Expressly Grants Power to Bind Absent Class Members

Rule 23 provides the basic procedure for litigating class actions in
federal courts, and it explicitly provides for power over absent class
members.68 The Rule was amended in December 2003, but the changes
only codified existing practice regarding notice, settlement, and
appointment of class counsel.69 Every class action certified in federal
See, e.g., Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1914) (holdingthat due process
was afforded even though defendant was not served and return of service was falsely
made).
65
Nagareda, supra note 1, at 293.
66
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
67
See infra Part II.B.1-2.
68
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
69
See Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium and the
Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 246 n.3 [hereinafter Mullenix,
No Exit] (stating that the proposed additions of Rule 23(g) and (h) were simply the
codification of existing practice in federal courts). The amendments provide no resolution
to the problems addressed by this Note concerning whether there is a basis for power over
putative class members after certification is denied. See infra Part IV.A-B. Rule 23(c)(2) was
amended to provide a more efficient notice process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). There
was also a revision explicitly giving courts discretion to require notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
class actions. See id. 23(c)(2)(A). The language of (c)(1) was slightly altered to change the
time when the certification decision should be made. See id. 23(c)(1). Prior to December 1,
2003, this rule required a decision as soon as practicable after the action started. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 cmt.(c)(1) (2003 Amendment). The drafters believed that the “as soon as
practicable” standard was not fitting with the practices of courts or the reasons for delaying
the certification decision. Id. Rule 23(e) was amended to more clearly define the
procedures for approving a class action settlement, now explicitly allowing for a fairness
hearing, objections by class members, and refusal of a settlement by the court if another
opportunity to opt out is not given. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) – (4). Finally, Rule 23(g) was
added, stating the procedure for choosing class counsel and requiring that class counsel
adequately represent the class, and Rule 23(h) sets out the guidelines for awarding attorney
fees. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g), (h).
64
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court still must meet the requirements of “numerosity, commonality, and
typicality.”70 In other words, there must be so many potential class
members that joinder is not feasible, there must be questions of fact or
law common to the class, and the class representative must have claims
that are “typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”71 Additionally,
Rule 23(a) requires that the named class representative provide adequate
representation at all times.72
Rule 23(b) creates three distinct types of class actions.73 The Rule
23(b)(1) class exists when individual suits would risk inconsistent
judgments, creating incompatible standards for the other party or if the
individual actions would substantially affect the interests of nonparties.74 The Rule 23(b)(2) class action is used when the opposing party
has acted in a way that is applicable generally to the class, making
injunctive or declaratory relief proper.75 The Rule 23(b)(3) class action is
used if “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class

70
See, e.g., John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1419, 1423 (2003).
71
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see Lukenas v. Bryce’s Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594, 596
(4th Cir. 1976) (noting that all federal class actions must satisfy the requirements of Rule
23(a)).
72
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Also, Rule 23(g) provides that “[a]n attorney appointed to serve
as class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” FED R. CIV.
P. 23(g)(1)(B). See infra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement
of adequate representation.
73
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). It is generally accepted that the remedy sought is the main
determinate in deciding whether to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). Graham
C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an Analytical Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV.
1008, 1031 (2003).
74
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180,
1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1999) (discussing certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and noting
that that there is no right to notice or to opt out of class actions certified under (b)(1)).
75
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). See, e.g,. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 331, 338-39
(2003) (describing certification under Rule 23 (b)(2)). In (b)(2) class actions, notice is not
required. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 (1975). Notice is discretionary both in
class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For
any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the
class.”) (2003 Amendment). Before the 2003 Amendment, Rule 23(d)(2) was used by courts
to require notice in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions at their discretion. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(d)(2) (“The court may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring, for the protection of
the members of the class . . . that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action.”); Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 952
(2003) (stating that a right to opt out may be required by the court under Rule 23(d)(2) for
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2)).
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predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”76
and a class action is the best method available to adjudicate the
controversy.77 The following list is the six requirements for bringing a
class action under Rule 23(b)(3): predominance, superiority, numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.78
Once a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), due process requires
that absent class members also receive notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and the right to opt out of the litigation in order to be bound by a
class action judgment.79 The notice must be “the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort.”80 In addition, the notice
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The precursor to the Rule 23(b)(3) class action was the
“spurious” class action, which was not binding on absent class members. JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 739 (1999); see Lilly, supra note 73, at 1015 (noting
that the spurious class action was often considered little more than a liberal joinder device).
77
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The Rule also gives factors to use when determining if a class
action is the most effective way to adjudicate the claim, which include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
Id. The official comment to this section states that this list is not exhaustive. FED. R. CIV. P.
23 cmt. (b)(3) (1966 Amendment). Though actions that meet the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) are not as convincingly fit for class treatment as those that meet the requirements
of Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), they do serve the purpose of saving time, effort, and expense, as
well as promoting uniform decisions for class members and opposing parties. Id., cmt.
(b)(3) (1966 Amendment).
78
Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1423; cf. Mullenix, No Exit, supra note 69, at 215
(stating that classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not need to meet the
predominance and superiority requirements for certification under Rule 23 (b)(3)).
79
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (c)(2)(B).
80
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). This rule was amended in 2003 and now states:
The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood
language: the nature of the action, the definition of the class certified,
the class claims, issues, or defenses, that a class member may enter an
appearance through counsel if the member so desires, that the court
will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion,
stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and the
binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule
23(c)(3).
Id. The Rule previously stated:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the
member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
76
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must state that the absent class members will be bound if they do not opt
out of the class action.81
2.

The Supreme Court Sets the Due Process Standard for Binding
Absent Class Members

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of power over absent class
members in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts.82
This case involved a
nationwide “damages” class action brought in a Kansas state court.83
Although the case dealt with Kansas class action law, the decision
interpreted the Due Process Clause and is applicable to Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions in federal court.84 Specifically in Shutts, the defendant
leased land in several different states in order to extract and produce
natural gas.85 Over 28,000 people were owed interest on delayed royalty
payments from the defendant because they possessed rights to these
land leases, and many did not have minimum contacts with Kansas.86 A
class was certified under Kansas law, and a judgment was issued in
favor of the class, which was affirmed by the Kansas Supreme Court.87
The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
contending that due process prevented the Kansas court from
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance
through counsel.
Id. 23(c)(2) (1966 Amendment); see infra Part II.B.3 for an analysis of the standards and
procedures of notice in class actions. There are additional provisions in Rule 23 that
require notice to members of any certified class in certain situations. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
23(e)(1)(B) (mandating that before a case can be dismissed or settled, reasonable notice be
given to all class members that would be bound by a judgment). Another example is that
Rule 23(h) mandates that before awarding attorney’s fees, a motion must be made and
reasonable notice must be given to all class members so that they have an opportunity to
object. Id. 23(h)(1) (2003 Amendment).
81
See Id. 23(c)(2)(B); see also supra notes 81, 99-104 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the right to opt out of a class.
82
472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that absent, nonresident class members can be bound to a
class judgment if due process is afforded). Three years earlier, the Court had a chance to
answer the question of whether it could bind an absent class member without traditional
personal jurisdiction in Gillette Co. v. Miner. 456 U.S. 914 (1982). After granting certiorari,
the Court dismissed the case because the lower court’s decision was not final, and the case
settled on remand. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1986).
83
Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Kan. 1984).
84
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.
85
Shutts, 679 P.2d at 1165.
86
Id.
87
Id.
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adjudicating the claims of the absent class members because the absent
class members did not have minimum contacts with Kansas.88 However,
the Court stated that the minimum contacts test does not apply to absent
class members and proceeded to define the due process requirements for
gaining power over absent class members.89 These requirements were
notice, an opportunity to be heard, an ability to opt out of the class, and
adequate representation.90 However, the Court limited its holding to
class actions dealing only with “claims wholly or predominately for
money judgments.”91

Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.
Id. at 811-12. This decision was made on appeal from the Kansas Supreme Court;
thus, the Shutts Court was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV). Nevertheless, the holding of Shutts has been applied to the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
90
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
91
Id. at 811-12. Footnote 3 states:
Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek to bind
[class members] concerning claims wholly or predominately for money
judgments. We intimate no view concerning other types of class
actions, such as those seeking equitable relief. Nor, of course, does our
discussion of personal jurisdiction address class actions where the
jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant class.
Id. This limitation created the “Shutts” problem, which involves whether mandatory
classes that include claims for both equitable relief and damages, such as some classes
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in federal courts, should be afforded the same protections as
classes predominately for damages. Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV.
727, 730 (1998) [hereinafter Mullenix, Getting to Shutts]. See generally Eubanks v. Billington,
110 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that courts have allowed monetary damages with
declaratory or injunctive relief in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions if the monetary relief does not
predominate). The majority rule in deciding whether to afford the right to opt out is to
consider the predominate relief sought. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, supra, at 737. The
actual standard courts use is very hard to determine. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due
Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2002).
The Supreme Court had a chance to resolve whether class members of classes certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) that include any claims for monetary damages fall within the purview
of Shutts and should be given the right to opt out. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S.
117 (1994). In that case, the district court held that an opt-out right was not proper, and the
Third Circuit affirmed the holding without issuing a written opinion. In re Real Estate Title
& Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1987). Essentially the same action
was filed in another district court and on appeal of the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the case was controlled by Shutts and that due process required a right to opt out if
monetary claims are involved. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir.
1992). This decision essentially stated that claimants must separate the damage claims
from equitable claims and certify the damage claims under Rule 23(b)(3). Mullenix, Getting
to Shutts, supra, at 737-38 (citing Ticor Title, 982 F.2d at 392). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but then dismissed the case as having granted it improvidently. Ticor Title, 511
U.S. at 118.
88
89
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In declaring that the minimum contacts test was inapplicable to
absent class members, the Court stated that the test was designed to
protect defendants from distant forum abuse when their lack of contacts
with the forum made it unfair to force them to defend there.92 Absent
class plaintiffs are rarely subject to counterclaims, cross-claims, fees,
litigation costs, or liability for damages.93 Therefore, the burden
defendants face is greater than the burden faced by absent class
members, which justifies application of the minimum contacts test to
defendants only.94
Although the Court refused to provide absent class plaintiffs with
the same protection as out-of-state defendants, it did require some
safeguards to protect the chose in action, which is a recognized property
right.95 It held that in order to be bound by a judgment in a class action
wholly or predominately for a money judgment, the class representative
must provide adequate representation at all times.96 In addition, the best
92
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807; cf. Carlough v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir.
1993) (citing In re Real Estate Title, 869 F.2d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 1989)) (“The procedural
protections of [Rule 23] replace the rigid rules of personal jurisdiction in this context and
are all that is needed to meet the requirements of due process.”).
93
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
94
Id. at 811; cf. Bassett, supra note 44, at 59 (reasoning that because applying the
minimum contacts test to absent class members would have virtually eliminated multistate
classes, this decision was necessary to maintain an efficient judicial system).
95
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12. A “chose in action” is a “right to receive or recover a debt,
demand, or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty.”
Kevin Pennell, Note, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A Contractual Solution to
a Contractual Problem, 82 TEX. L. REV. 481, 483 (2003) (quoting Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582
N.E.2d 338, 339 n.1 (Ind. 1991)). There are also protections built into the federal class action
rules that help justify not applying the minimum contacts test to absent class plaintiffs. See
Bassett, supra note 44, at 67; see supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of Rule 23.
96
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)); see FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring a judicial finding that the class representative will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class in order for certification to be proper); FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) (requiring that the class counsel also fairly and adequately represent the
class). It has been suggested that the requirement of adequate representation be applied
less stringently when there is an opportunity to opt out of the class. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370, 438 (2000). Nevertheless, under Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members
that do not opt out may be able to challenge the adequacy of representation either in a
subsequent proceeding or by intervening in the original action. Lilly, supra note 73, at 1035.
The majority view is that the original forum is the appropriate court to hear attacks on the
adequacy of representation. Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1150 (1998) (citing In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (2d Cir. 1993) for the proposition
that there is a constitutional obligation to hear collateral attacks regarding the adequacy of
representation). However, Professor Monaghan argues that because class representatives

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/5

Bertsch: Missing the Mark: The Search for an Effective Class Certificatio

2004]

Effective Class Certification

109

notice practicable under the circumstances must be given to the class
members, including individual notice if the absent class members can be
located through reasonable effort.97 The notice must apprise absent class
members of their right to be heard in the action,98 and inform them of
their right to opt out of the proceedings.99
The Court did not require class members to affirmatively opt in to
the class.100 Instead, it inferred their consent based on their failure to opt
out of the class.101 The Court assumed consent was required and stated
that the real question was what showing of consent was needed.102
need to provide adequate representation until the judgment is made and because the
chance to opt out ends before the judgment is made, there is a period of time in between
the two which causes problems for the absent class member who may want to opt out
based on something the representative does toward the end of the proceedings. Id. at 1169.
Because the class members do not impliedly consent to inadequate representation, there
should be an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of representation in another forum. Id.
at 1169. However, the counter to this argument is that it is not adequacy in fact that is
required, but an adequate structure for determining adequacy of representation in the
original forum, making it the appropriate place to determine adequacy. Nagareda, supra
note 1, at 313.
97
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 31415 (1950)) (“The notice must be the best practicable, ‘reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.’”). See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the
notice requirements in certified class actions.
98
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that the notice in Rule
23(b)(3) class actions inform the class members of their right to be excluded from the class).
99
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. This generally would be accomplished by sending an “opt
out” form to the absent class members that would be executed and returned to the court.
Id. For a discussion of the split of authority regarding the necessity of a chance to opt out
of Rule 23 (b)(2) that seek some money damages, see supra note 91.
100
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. An opt-in requirement would cause class actions to lose their
effectiveness in litigating multistate small claims cases. Issacharoff, supra note 91, at 1064.
To prevent the dramatic increase in transaction costs that this would have, and anticipating
the lack of response from most class members with small claims, Shutts and subsequent
cases hold that consent is assumed originally, and absent plaintiffs need only be given the
opportunity to show a lack of consent. Id.; see Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 11-13
(asserting that small claims would not survive an opt-in requirement, and parties with
large claims are well-protected by the right to opt out of the class).
101
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-81 (1984)
(stating that anyone can consent to personal jurisdiction in any forum); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913
F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) a party waives any
objection to personal jurisdiction if it is not raised in the first responsive pleading with the
court, but this merely sets the lower limit and does not preclude a court from inferring
consent); see also Lilly, supra note 73, at 1031 (noting that because absent class members are
impliedly consenting to jurisdiction for what is written in the notice, they are free to
challenge issues and claims not listed in the notice).
102
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. This is similar to the legal gymnastics courts used before
International Shoe, when implied consent was often necessary to reach an equitable result
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Inferring consent was necessary to protect the class members’ chose in
action.103
Implied consent, made possible through notice and the right to opt
out, adequate representation, and the right to be heard, is required to
afford due process and allow for constitutional power to bind absent
class members.104
The linchpin to providing these due process
protections is notice.105 As discussed above, in Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions, notice acts as a conduit for inferring consent through refusal to
opt out of the class.106 It is also “the single greatest safeguard against
inadequate representation,”107 and the only way to provide a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.108

while staying within the bounds of the territoriality-based Pennoyer rules. See supra notes
49-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implied consent fiction used by courts
after Pennoyer. Nevertheless, in 1977 the Supreme Court held that all assertions of personal
jurisdiction need to be evaluated under the minimum contacts test, which could lead one to
believe that Shutts was decided more based on fundamental fairness than on implied
consent. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). Additionally, inferring consent
from the refusal to opt out seems improper because normally there is personal jurisdiction
followed by notice to perfect it, but in Shutts, notice was used to gain power to bind. See
Sarajane K. Walker, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: The
Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 459 (1983)
(arguing that a court lacking power to compel appearance arguably has no authority to
compel a putative class member to opt in or opt out); Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 620 (1987) (stating that the Shutts implied
consent theory violates the general theory of consent because “a court with no power over
an individual should have no power to attach adverse legal consequences to the
individual’s refusal or neglect to answer a communication from that court”).
103
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313); see Patrick Woolley, Rethinking
the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 585-89 (1997) (describing the
history of considering a cause of action to be a constitutionally protected property interest).
104
See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992);
Bassett, supra note 44, at 58-60; Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for
“Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 766
n.3 (1998); cf. Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting
Shutts to mean that there is no jurisdiction over absent class members that do not otherwise
consent until after the opt out period has ended). After a class is certified, there would still
be no power over the putative class members until the opt out period has ended. See In re
Sulzer Hip Prosthesis and Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig. No. 101CV9000, MDL 1401, 2001 WL
1842158, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2001) (noting that at most this would be “a harmless
initial jurisdictional overreach” that could be remedied).
105
See infra Part II.B.3.
106
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12.
107
Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1171 (Kan. 1984) (citing Mullane, 339
U.S. at 314).
108
See infra Part II.B.3
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Notice Is the Key to Gaining Power over Absent Class Members

Rule 23(c)(2) sets the notice requirements for class actions in federal
courts.109 The official comments to this rule cite to Mullane,110 and the
rule itself requires that in all class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
the absent class members must receive the “best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort.”111 The Supreme Court in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin112 upheld this standard for providing notice to
absent class members and held that for the class members identifiable
through reasonable efforts, first class mail afforded due process.113 In so
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). See supra note 80 for the text of Rule 23(c)(2). The
requirements for service on defendants are more rigorous than those imposed on notice to
absent class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt. (d)(2) (1966 Amendment) (stating that
class notice need not meet the formalities of service of process on defendants). “Although
service by first-class mail is an option under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), if no acknowledgement of
service is returned, personal service or service at the individual’s dwelling house is then
required.” Wood, supra note 102, at 621 (“This initial safeguard of the absentee’s interest is
precisely what justifies a finding of waiver with respect to personal jurisdiction objections
when the defendant appears and is silent, and it is lacking in Rule 23(c)(2).”).
110
FED. R. CIV. P. 23, cmt. (d)(2) (1966 Amendment). The official commentary noted that
the mandatory notice under Rule 23(c)(2), when combined with the discretionary notice of
Rule 23(d)(2), fulfills the due process requirements. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15;
Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1959); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979
(2d Cir. 1952)).
111
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088,
1105 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that notice given under (c)(2) must be that which “a reasonable
person would consider to be material in making an informed, intelligent decision of
whether to opt out”). However, the procedural safeguards offered by Rule 23(a) provide
support for the idea that notice is not required when the class is certified under Rule
23(b)(1) or (b)(2). See Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 314-15 (1973) (stating that the due process concerns that are addressed by notice are
adequately addressed by these requirements for certification in mandatory class actions).
Professor Miller also notes that this reasoning is not persuasive in class actions certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) because the groups lack the cohesiveness possessed by a class with
similar interests or a class seeking an injunction or declaratory judgment common to all
class members. Id. at 315. Further, class members of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions seek
different damages, and have little cohesiveness, which the drafters took into account when
determining that there needed to be mandatory notice to class members in Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions. Id. at 315-16. In addition, notice costs in any context could easily cripple class
actions not seeking damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt (c)(2) (2003 Amendment).
112
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
113
Id. at 175. The Eisen Court held that all 2,250,000 class members whose names and
addresses could be identified through reasonable effort should receive notice via first-class
mail even though to do so would be prohibitively expensive for the class representatives.
Id. at 176. It has been argued that this requirement should not be read literally, and notice
should be more flexible to account for the enormous cost involved. Miller, supra note 111,
at 319-20.
109
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holding, the Court was faithful to the wording of Rule 23(c)(2) and
required best notice practicable with no express requirement of
individual notice through reasonable efforts.114
The Court’s decision in Shutts stretched the Eisen holding, which was
based on an interpretation of Rule 23, into a broader due process
requirement.115 Like the Eisen Court, the Shutts Court held that notice by
first class mail not returned as undeliverable affords due process in Rule
23(b)(3) class actions.116 However, these decisions set the minimum
notice requirements, and Rule 23(d) can be used to set higher standards,
such as certified mail or opting-in to the class.117 Even though certified
mail would provide certainty of receipt and bolster the theory of implied
consent, it is rarely required because it is usually prohibitively
expensive.118
Plaintiffs’ attorneys and courts face a daunting task when
determining what constitutes the best notice practicable in class
actions.119 The tremendous costs involved, especially when individual
Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1437.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314-15). There were attempts by groups such as the litigation section of the American Bar
Association to make notice in all class actions discretionary before Shutts. Miller & Crump,
supra note 82, at 31 n.217 (noting that a literal reading of Shutts suggests that a requirement
of discretionary notice would be unconstitutional).
116
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. Settlements of class actions raise additional concerns and call
for added protections to be given to class members. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995). If there is a proposed
settlement in any class action certified under Rule 23, there must be notice given to the class
members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner
to all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal,
or compromise.”). Notice of proposed settlement is necessary either when there is a
settlement after certification or when a class is certified for settlement purposes. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 cmt. (e)(1) (2003 Amendment). This allows for an opportunity to be heard
regarding the fairness of the terms of a proposed settlement. Lilly, supra note 73, at 1032.
In addition, the court may require a renewed opportunity to opt out as a prerequisite for
certifying a settlement of the class claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(C)(3).
117
David Crump, What Really Happens During Class Certification? A Primer for the FirstTime Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LITIG. 1, 19 (1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d); Eisen, 417 U.S.
at 175-77); see Klemow v. Time, Inc., 352 A.2d 12, 16-17 (Pa. 1976) (holding that
Pennsylvania law required an opt-in for the absent class members to be bound). These
options may be beneficial to defendants in certain situations. Cf. Greenhaw v. Lubbock
County Beverage Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that in one case, there
was a recovery fund of $2 million, but the class members were paid only $17,482).
118
Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 20.
119
Willging, supra note 1, at 129. In a survey of four federal district courts, it was found
that in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, individual notice is almost always used, supplemented
by publication in two-thirds of the cases, and rare use of the broadcast media. Id.
114
115
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notice is required, is an important issue to consider in Rule 23(b)(3)
actions.120 Courts can add the cost of notice onto a judgment against the
defendant.121 However, the Eisen Court struck down a procedure
utilizing a preliminary determination on the merits to determine
whether the defendant should have to pay some of the notice costs at the
beginning of the suit.122 Therefore, class representatives still pay for
notice.123 Nevertheless, there is often a clause in settlement agreements
forcing defendants to pay for all or part of the notice costs. This clause is
especially effective if a class is certified for settlement purposes because
the plaintiffs will not have to pay any of the notice costs at the beginning
of the suit.124
Many have argued that notice to class members is generally
ineffective.125 Notice is generally sent to non-lawyers and is laden with
legalese, which often causes it to be discarded.126 When an absent class
member does not fully appreciate the significance of the notice, or even
receive notice, the consent inferred is fictional.127 These concerns
prompted the recent revision to Rule 23(c)(2), which gives specific notice
requirements designed to make notice more effective.128 However, the
drafters of the amendment noted that given the complex nature of class
actions and the audience to which the notice is sent, there will inevitably
be problems.129

120
Crump, supra note 117, at 19. The cost of notice is often used by defendants to
persuade plaintiffs not to bring class actions. Id. Most attorneys use class action notice
companies in order to give notice to absent class members.
See Notice.com,
http://www.notice.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (supporting website for The Notice
Company, which is based in Hingham, MA).
121
Crump, supra note 117, at 19.
122
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. The Court reasoned that this procedure would have prejudiced
to the defendant because the rules and procedures of civil trials would not be present,
which may have affected the subsequent proceedings and placed a difficult burden on the
defendant. Id.
123
Id. at 179.
124
Willging, supra note 1, at 126-27 (noting that sometimes the named parties attempt to
delay class notice until a settlement or decision on the merits is made, thus allowing the
defendant to pay the notice costs).
125
Id.
126
See Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 17.
127
Id. at 17-18.
128
See supra note 80 for a comparison of the new Rule 23(c)(2) and the one in place before
December 1, 2003.
129
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt. (c)(2) (2003 Amendment).
The direction that class-certification notice be couched in plain, easily
understood language is a reminder of the need to work unremittingly
at the difficult task of communicating with class members. It is
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Notice also acts as a conduit for providing an opportunity to be
heard.130 Once an absent class member receives notice, he can “enter an
appearance through counsel.”131 This has been interpreted to mean that
he can receive the motions, pleadings, and other filings in the litigation,
as well as notice of hearings, in order to determine if he should
intervene.132 If a class member chooses to intervene, he can present
evidence, make arguments and motions, conduct discovery, and request
an appeal of the class certification decision.133
Clearly, the Court has stated that the presence of adequate
representation, notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out
will be enough to create the constitutional power necessary to bind
absent class members to a judgment in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.134
difficult to provide information about most class actions that is both
accurate and easily understood by class members who are not
themselves lawyers. Factual uncertainty, legal complexity, and the
complication of class-action procedure raise the barriers high. The
Federal Judicial Center has created illustrative clear-notice forms that
provide a helpful starting point for actions similar to those described
in the forms.
Id.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that due process
required a right to be heard); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979)
(stating that there is a constitutional right to notice and to an opportunity to be heard).
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
132
See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 392 (1967) (interpreting former Rule
23(c)(2)(C)).
133
Woolley, supra note 103, at 580, 604 (noting that the successful intervenor does not
have to be bound by the decisions the representative makes and should be treated as a full
party). If a timely motion to intervene is made, an absent class member will have the right
to intervene under Rule 24(a) if he can show inadequate representation. See FED. R. CIV. P.
24(a). Additionally, there can be permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) even if the
representation is adequate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). It has been argued that there should
be an absolute right to intervene in class actions. See Woolley, supra note 103, at 607
(arguing that there should only be an exception for manageability, such as if far too many
people intervene); Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J.
1204, 1223-24 (1966) (stating there should be a right to intervention, but that courts can limit
the activities of intervenors). Although some argue this will lead to manageability
problems, it is unlikely that too many people would seek to intervene. Woolley, supra note
103, at 608 (arguing that there would be substantial attorney’s fees, and that even if there is
a contingent fee arrangement available, fees generally will not be recoverable by the
intervenor because he must contribute substantially to the litigation to share in the fees). In
fact, in one study of four federal district courts, there were attempts to intervene in only
11%, 9%, 5%, and 0% of the cases in each district. Willging, supra note 1, at 140. Allowing a
right to intervene in class actions would strengthen the watchdog effect intervenors have
on the class representation, decreasing protection for the absent class members. See id.
134
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
130

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/5

Bertsch: Missing the Mark: The Search for an Effective Class Certificatio

2004]

Effective Class Certification

115

However, there is a competing doctrine that treats absent class members
as parties for certain procedural purposes, sometimes even in the
absence of the required due process protections.135 The Seventh Circuit
in Bridgestone/Firestone used this doctrine to justify gaining power over
putative class members without offering notice or an opportunity to be
heard.136
C. Treating Absent Class Members as Parties to Procedural Events
Absent class members are sometimes treated as parties for
procedural events, but it can be difficult to determine when this is
proper.137 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally define
“party.”138 Nevertheless, Rule 23 envisions active participation in the
class action proceedings for party status to attach.139 For example, courts
have held that absent class members were not parties for the purpose of
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.B.
137
See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002). Absent class members may be
considered parties or nonparties based on the situation and the judge’s opinion of the
status of absent class members. HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 16.01, 16.02 (3d ed. 1992). Putative class members have been notoriously
difficult for courts to categorize, and there have been many labels attached to this group.
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 343 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); cf.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (absent parties); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) (interested parties). They may also be considered parties
while analyzing the status of the case before certification. Roper, 445 U.S. at 343 n.3
(Stevens, J., concurring).
138
Ian Gallacher, Representative Litigation in Maryland: The Past, Present, and Future of the
Class Action Rule in State Court, 58 MD. L. REV. 1510, 1545 (1999). If the Rules are looked at
in conjunction, a “party” appears to be “one who has sued or is being sued in current
litigation, or one who has intervened in the action, and is therefore an active, not passive,
litigant.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 17(a)).
139
Id. However, some courts have used Rule 23(d) to require affirmative action on the
part of absent class members in order to reap the benefits of class membership. NEWBERG
& CONTE, supra note 137, § 16.01, 16.02. In Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., the State of
Iowa, on behalf of all its subdivisions, sued an asphalt manufacturer. 281 F. Supp. 391, 40001 (S.D. Iowa 1968). The court stated that Rule 23(c)(2) did not prevent, and that Rule
23(d)(2) allowed for, the class notice to require absent class members to indicate if they
intended to submit damage claims in order to be a part of the class, essentially creating an
opt in class. Id. at 403-04. In Harris v. Jones, the court stated that within a reasonable time
after determining who opted out after the first notice, another notice should be given to the
absent class members “requiring them to file simple statements of their claims . . . with
reference to the types and sources of representation, if any, upon which they relied in
purchasing their securities and the time they first learned any representations were false.”
41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966). If this information was not submitted, the action could be
dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 74-75. This information would allow the court to better
assess the adequacy of the class representatives and the potential effectiveness of
subclasses. Id.
135
136
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gaining the consent required to have a case transferred to a magistrate.140
Despite this holding, intervention by absent class members, which is
certainly active participation that gives class members party status, does
not violate the complete diversity rule because only named class
members are considered parties for determining whether there is
complete diversity.141
The Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti142 stated that the status of
absent class members as parties or non-parties should be determined
based on the context of the procedural rule in which the question
arises.143 The decision must be made by looking at the “goals of class
action litigation,” especially judicial economy and efficiency of
administration.144 In Devlin, after the district court preliminarily certified
a settlement class in a Rule 23(b)(1) class action, an absent class member
failed to timely intervene and instead objected at the settlement fairness
Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998). The
question raised by this case was whether unnamed class members needed to consent to
having the case transferred to a federal magistrate judge in order to be bound to the
magistrate’s decision. Id. The court held that the absent class members were not parties for
this purpose because requiring their consent would virtually eliminate cases being referred
to magistrates in class actions, essentially creating opt-in classes. Id. The court went on to
reason that if absent class members “are more accurately regarded as having something
less than full party status, the need for their express consent also changes.” Id. If an absent
class member wants to contest the cause being given to a magistrate, he can intervene
under Rule 24(a), which would make him a party, and then he could refuse to consent to
the transfer. Id. The absent class member could also make a collateral challenge to the
adequacy of representation based on the representative’s decision to consent to transferring
the case to the magistrate. Id. (noting that in both intervention and collateral attacks, there
would need to be a showing of inadequate representation).
141
Cauble, 255 U.S. at 363, 366-67. This rule allowing for the consideration of only named
class members when deciding if there is complete diversity is appropriate because to hold
otherwise would have the effect of invalidating most multistate classes in federal court.
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9-10. In Stewart v. Dunham, class plaintiffs were allowed to intervene
after removal of the case, and they destroyed complete diversity. 115 U. S. 61, 64 (1885).
142
536 U.S. 1.
143
Id. at 9-10. “The label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a
conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on
context.” Id. However, the dissent in Devlin and some commentators have noted the
uncertainty that has been created by this reasoning. Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s opinion . . . abandons the bright-line rule that only those persons named as such
are parties to a judgment, in favor of a vague inquiry ‘based on context.’”); see Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 116 HARV. L. REV. 332, 332 (2002) (criticizing this decision for
creating too much uncertainty).
144
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 143, at 339 (quoting Devlin, 536, U.S. at 10).
The Court’s interpretation of the term “party” created uncertainty about whether an absent
class member may be considered a party for other events in class action litigation. Id. at
336.
140
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hearing.145 The district court overruled his objection and did not allow
him to appeal.146 The Supreme Court later held that any absent class
member objecting to a proposed settlement at the fairness hearing is
treated as a party and can appeal without formally intervening.147
However, the issues that can be raised on appeal are limited to those
objected to at the fairness hearing.148 The dissent noted that “[n]ot even
petitioner . . . [was] willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous
argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the class-action
litigation before the class is certified.”149
In determining whether the objector should be given party status,
the Court focused on two factors.150 One was whether his interests
diverged from the class representative, which would be evidenced by his
objection at the settlement fairness hearing.151 The other was the binding
effect of the judgment on the objector.152 The objector in Devlin was not
given the opportunity to opt out of the class because it was certified
under Rule 23(b)(1).153 The extension of the Devlin reasoning to Rule
23(b)(3) class actions has been questioned because there is another
remedy available to potential objectors—opting out of the case.154 In fact,
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(A) (“Any class member may object to
a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise that requires court approval.”).
Several courts have found participation in the fairness hearing to be a due process
requirement. See, e.g., Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1153 (8th Cir. 1999).
146
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 3-4.
147
Id. Generally, only parties to a suit can appeal an adverse judgment. Marino v. Ortiz,
484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988). Previously, some courts held that absent class members had no
right to appeal without formally intervening. See In re Navigant Consulting, Inc., Sec.
Litig., 275 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2001) (arguing that because the absent class members were
not considered parties for determining complete diversity, they cannot be treated as parties
for the purpose of having a right to appeal); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 115 F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that absent class members can only gain
power to appeal by intervening); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 629 (11th Cir. 1987)
(arguing that if absent class members were given a right to appeal it would inhibit the
manageability of the litigation, which is one of the primary goals of class actions).
148
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
149
Id. at 16 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
150
Id. at 10.
151
Id. at 9. The dissent stated that under the Restatement’s reasoning, the objector was
not a party but was bound by the judgment as though he were. Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
152
Id. at 10.
153
Id.
154
See In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002)
(“Because the Court relied upon the mandatory character of the class action, we question
whether the Devlin’s holding applies to opt out class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)”);
Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The scope of Devlin
remains uncertain at this time.”). Although one could argue that because absent class
145

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 5

118

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly refused to extend Devlin to an
opt-out class action, although its decision was based on state certification
law rather than on Federal Rule 23.155
Absent class members are also treated as parties for the purpose of
tolling the statute of limitations.156 This tolling rule allows the statute of
limitations on each class member’s individual claims to be tolled from
the time a class suit is filed until certification is denied.157 The Supreme
Court has never answered the question of whether this tolling rule
applies if a putative class member in the first action attempts to become a
class representative in a subsequent action.158 Additionally, most courts
have not allowed tolling when the potential class plaintiffs have
previously been denied certification and then attempt to “stack” one
class action onto another in order to relitigate the certification question in
different courts.159
Treating class members as parties for procedural events is a very
limited way to gain power over absent class members.160 Thus, in the
members in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions have the opportunity to opt out, they are not truly
bound by the decision; the Devlin Court drew no such distinction. Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure, supra note 143, at 344 n.48. In fact, it may be good policy to allow appeals in opt
out class cases because it would reduce the incentive to opt out and further the class action
goal of concentrated litigation. Id.; see infra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion of how this
reasoning is not appropriately extended to class certification proceedings.
155
Ballard v. Advanced Am. Cash Advance Ctr. of Ark., 79 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ark. 2002).
The Arkansas court attempted to distinguish the case from Devlin by stating that there were
differences in the Arkansas class action rule, the opportunity to opt out was present, and
Arkansas case law required the absent class member to intervene before he could appeal.
Id. It has been argued that the only significant difference between the two decision was the
ability of the objector in Ballard to opt out of the case. Chip Leibovich, Civil Procedure, 25 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 887, 891 (2003) (noting that the rules of procedure that governed
class actions in the two cases were nearly identical and that the absent class members in
both cases moved to intervene at virtually the same time). This difference is significant,
though, in the sense that the Devlin decision gave much weight to the fact that the appeal
was the petitioner’s only protection from being bound by the settlement. Id. at 892.
156
Ballard, 79 S.W.3d at 553.
157
Id.; see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (holding that the
tolling rule applied to putative class members that brought individual actions after the
class certification was denied).
158
Vinson v. Seven Seventeen HB Phil. Corp., No. Civ. A00-6334, 2001 WL 1774073 at *6
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2001).
159
Id.; see, e.g., Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that tolling rule
only applies if the subsequent action is separate, not for similar class claims); Robbin v.
Fluor Corp., 835 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1987); Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d Cir.
1987); Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir.
1985).
160
See supra notes 137-49.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/5

Bertsch: Missing the Mark: The Search for an Effective Class Certificatio

2004]

Effective Class Certification

119

context of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, courts generally must provide
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to opt out in order to
gain power over absent class members.161 A trickier question arises
when courts attempt to gain power over putative class members in order
to bind them to the class certification decision.162 There is currently a
split of authority over whether this power is proper and what due
process requires to make this exercise of power constitutional.163
III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THERE IS
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO BIND PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS WHEN CLASS
CERTIFICATION IS DENIED
Only two federal circuit courts have ruled on the constitutionality of
exercising power over putative class members after class certification is
denied in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.164 The Third Circuit in GM Trucks
II held that such power was not present because a chance to opt out was
not given, and thus, there was no way to infer consent from the putative
class members.165 Additionally, the court stated that putative class
members were not parties for the procedural event of class
certification.166 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit recently held in
Bridgestone/Firestone that there was power to bind putative class members
to a certification denial if they were adequately represented.167 The court
buttressed this holding by finding that putative class members are
parties for class certification.168 In the court’s opinion, it had power
under the All Writs Act169 to enjoin the entire putative class and their

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); see supra Part II.B.2.
See generally infra Part III.
163
See infra Part III.
164
Compare GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998), with Bridgestone/Firestone,
333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003).
165
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141.
166
Id.
167
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
168
Id.
169
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). Federal courts have power under the All Writs Act to
“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id.; see In re Paine Webber Ltd. P’ship Litig.,
No. 94 Civ. 8547SHS, 1996 WL 374162 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1996) (granting an injunction
against class members from filing actions in state court during the federal settlement
approval process). See generally Joan Steinman, Managing Punitive Damages: A Role for
Mandatory “Limited Generosity” Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1043, 1105-06 (2001) (discussing the applicability of the Act generally).
161
162
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attorneys from attempting to certify the same nationwide class in
another forum.170
A. The Third Circuit Holds There Is No Power over the Putative Class
In 1998, the Third Circuit decided GM Trucks II, a case involving a
claim for damages stemming from General Motor’s manufacture of an
allegedly defective gas tank on a certain model of pickup truck.171 Many
federal actions were filed in different jurisdictions, but they were all
transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for discovery and pretrial proceedings pursuant to the Multi-District Litigation statute.172
When the parties had reached a settlement agreement, the district court
preliminarily approved it and certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3).173
After notice of the proposed settlement was given to the class, the district
court gave final approval to the settlement.174 The defendant appealed,
and the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the requirements of Rule 23
were not met by this class.175
During the federal court proceedings, the same parties were engaged
in a parallel class action in a Louisiana state court.176 The state court
preliminarily certified the same class, approved the same settlement, and
ordered individual notice be sent to the class members.177 Several class
members that were absent from the federal action moved the federal
court for intervention and for an injunction against the Louisiana state
court proceedings.178 However, the district court denied the motion to
intervene and also refused to grant the injunction, forcing the parties to
appeal.179 While the appeal was in progress, the Louisiana court entered
final judgment and approved the settlement.180

Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 138.
172
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000)). If there are multiple class actions in federal court,
there is power under the Multi-District Litigation statute to consolidate them for the
purpose of pre-trial procedures, which would include class certification. Brian D. Boyle,
Parallel State and Federal Court Class Actions, 31 THE BRIEF 32, 34 (2002).
173
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 138 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 139.
176
Id.
177
Id. (noting that the class certified in state court contained both named and absent
parties from the federal action).
178
Id. at 140.
179
Id. The Third Circuit stated that it was proper to deny the motion to intervene
because it was made four months after the claim was filed and two months after the
proposed settlement was presented without a showing of good cause except an attempt to
170
171
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The Third Circuit held that it did not have power to bind the 5.7
million people in the Louisiana class in order to enjoin the Louisiana
proceedings.181 Absent personal jurisdiction over the putative class
members, the due process protections mandated by Shutts would need to
be given.182 However, since there was no class pending, no right to opt
out had been given, and thus there was no way to infer consent from the
putative class members.183 In other words, because the members of the
Louisiana settlement class were not parties to the Third Circuit’s
proceedings, there was no way to infer consent, and they did not have
minimum contacts with the forum state; as a result there were no
grounds to bind them to the class certification decision and enjoin them
from repeated certification attempts.184
In dicta, the Third Circuit stated that enjoining the named parties,
even those who have minimum contacts with the forum state, may be
appropriate.185 However, such an injunction would be of little value
argue that there was no reason to intervene until the class representatives attempted to
certify the class in the Louisiana court. Id. at 140 n.1.
180
Id. at 140.
181
Id. at 141. The court also held that it could not enjoin the Louisiana class members
because the Louisiana court had entered a final judgment, and review was barred by the
Full Faith and Credit Act and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 141-43 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (2000); Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1992)).
182
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985).
183
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141.
184
Id.; see Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All
Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773, 862 (2000) (stating that in the absence of traditional personal
jurisdiction or conduct in the litigation sufficient to infer consent, there would be no power
over absent class members to enjoin them from attempting to certify the class in parallel
state litigation).
185
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141 n.2.
We note that enjoining the few Louisiana class members that the MDL
court does have personal jurisdiction over . . . would serve no
purpose. Barring the other procedural barriers discussed infra, it is
conceivable that we could direct the district court to enjoin those 200
plaintiffs from pursuing their state damage remedies in Louisiana. As
the district court properly pointed out, however, since the appellants’
stated goal here is to prevent the Louisiana court from further
consideration of the settlement in toto, little would be accomplished by
enjoining only those 200 plaintiffs . . . and we have not been asked to
do so. At all events, the limited injunction would not halt the
Louisiana proceedings because the original Louisiana plaintiffs (over
whom we have no jurisdiction) could simply continue with the
settlement.
Id.; see Monaghan, supra note 96, at 1185 n.171 (arguing that the GM Trucks II court refused
to consider that it had power to enjoin the class representatives in the Louisiana state court
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because any absent class member without minimum contacts could
certify the class in another forum.186 The defendant could not even argue
collateral estoppel against these absent class members because they did
not have a chance to litigate the issue in the original proceeding.187 Other
courts have noted that there may be power over absent class members if
there is a separate basis for personal jurisdiction over them and notice is
given.188
The Third Circuit also held that the Anti-Injunction Act prevented
enjoining the putative class members in this case because the state court
proceedings had already begun.189 The Anti-Injunction Act bars a
federal district court from enjoining pending state court litigation unless
“expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
[the federal court’s] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.”190 The third exception, commonly referred to as the
relitigation exception, is based on the concepts of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.191 Some courts, including the Third Circuit in GM
Trucks II, have held that a class certification decision is not a final
judgment that satisfies the relitigation exception.192
Consequently, the Third Circuit refused to enjoin the Louisiana class
members, in part, because it lacked power to do so and because the AntiInjunction Act prevented interference with the ongoing state litigation.193

class action because they joined in the federal action and because they had common legal
representation with the federal class action representatives).
186
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141.
187
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
188
See In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 48 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that
dicta in GM Trucks II provides that the federal court can enjoin parties over which it has
personal jurisdiction from bringing parallel litigation in state courts); see also Hillman v.
Webley, 115 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the district court had power
“under the All Writs Act to enjoin parties before it from pursuing conflicting litigation in
the state court, but unfortunately it did not pursue that route”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Actions: Interjurisdictional Warfare, 218 N.Y. L.J. 5, 35 (1997) (noting that federal district
courts have power to enjoin the parties before them, including enjoining defendants from
settling with other class plaintiffs in another court).
189
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 144.
190
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S.
281, 286 (1970).
191
See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988).
192
See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 146; J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d
176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996). However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bridgestone/Firestone
created a circuit split on this issue. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act.
193
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 146.
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This view remained unchallenged until the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Bridgestone/Firestone in June 2003.194
B. The Seventh Circuit Holds That There Is Power over the Putative Class if It
Is Adequately Represented
In Bridgestone/Firestone, the Seventh Circuit held that there was
constitutional power to bind putative class members of an alleged Rule
23(b)(3) class to a class certification denial if they were adequately
represented.195 Once it established it had power over the putative class,
the court used its power under the All Writs Act to enjoin the class
members from attempting to certify the same nationwide class in a
different forum.196
The plaintiffs in this case were consumers of recalled Ford vehicles
and Firestone tires.197 The district court originally granted their motion
to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3).198 However, the Seventh Circuit
decertified the class on appeal because choice of law problems prevented
the class from meeting the predominance requirement.199 The named
plaintiffs, and also some absent class members, then attempted to have
333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 769. Although not in the context of class actions, a Texas federal court used the
reasoning of Bridgestone/Firestone to buttress its argument that an injunction was proper to
prevent the filing of a suit by the parties and privies of the original suit so as to uphold the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Dow Agrosciences v. Bates, No. Civ.A.
5:01-CV-331-C, 2003 WL 22660741, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2003). The plaintiffs had
“intentionally stacked the deck against [the defendant] by simultaneous pursuit of so many
different parallel state court actions.” Id. “The law cannot tolerate the risk that even one
state court might carve out some exception to res judicata and collateral estoppel and allow
the action before it to proceed.” Id.
196
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000) (the All Writs
Act)). Parallel cases were pending in state courts, so the Seventh Circuit held that denials
of class certification fall within the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which
bars federal courts from enjoining pending state court proceedings. Id. at 766; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (2000); see also supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text discussing the Third
Circuit’s analysis. However, recently, a Texas state court has certified a settlement class of
the same character as the one denied by the Seventh Circuit.
See Shields v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. B-170, 462, 2004 WL 546883, at *43 (Tex. Dist. Mar. 12,
2004). That court held that because it was a settlement class, the problems of commonality
and manageability that had derailed the certification process in the federal court were not
at issue. Id. Thus, the court distinguished its decision from the Seventh Circuit’s based on
the notion that the Seventh Circuit had left the door open for settlement classes to be
certified in this action. Id.
197
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th
Cir. 2002).
198
Id. at 1017.
199
Id.
194
195
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the same nationwide class certified in several other jurisdictions.200 In
reaction to these repeated certification attempts, the defendants moved
the federal court for an injunction barring the entire putative class and
class counsel from attempting to certify a class with the same or
substantially similar characteristics in any other jurisdiction.201 The trial
court denied the motion, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and granted
the injunction.202
Mainly, the court granted the injunction to prevent putative class
members from repeatedly attempting to certify the same class it had
already held was untenable.203 The court envisioned a situation in which
nine judges refuse to certify a class, but a tenth judge certifies it,
rendering each of the previous nine decisions meaningless.204 The court
also discussed how the probability that a class will be certified increases
as the number of certification attempts increases.205 It concluded that
even if only one judge in ten would certify a particular class and an
attempt for certification were made in ten different states, there would be
a sixty-five percent chance of class certification, with the percent
increasing to eighty-eight if the attempt were made in twenty states.206
In what appeared to be an attempt to take the case out of the
purview of Shutts, the Bridgestone/Firestone plaintiffs argued that the
putative class members could not be bound by the decision because the
federal court did not have the power to issue nationwide service of
process in class actions.207 However, the court stated that this rule is
qualified by the fact that a federal court can issue nationwide service of
process if there is a federal law relied on in the complaint that authorizes
such service.208 In this case, the plaintiff relied on the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), which does

200
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765; see Shields, 2004 WL 546883, at *25 (noting that in
addition to the certification attempt in this Texas court, putative class action lawsuits were
filed in various states, including Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, and
Wisconsin).
201
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765.
202
Id. at 766.
203
Id. at 767.
204
Id. at 766-67.
205
Id. at 767.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 768.
208
Id.
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authorize nationwide service.209 Nevertheless, service was not given to
the putative class members, making the point merely dicta.210
The court then declared that because absent class members have
been treated as parties for many procedural events, they should be
treated as parties for the purpose of class certification.211 The court then
attempted to analogize this case to Devlin, in which the Supreme Court
had allowed absent class members to appeal a judgment, even though
they did not intervene, because they had objected at a settlement fairness
hearing.212 The Seventh Circuit stated that because the putative class
members could have sought certiorari after its decision, they were
parties and were bound by the decision as long as they were adequately
represented, an issue which was not contested in this case.213 The reason
the Seventh Circuit attempted to analogize Bridgestone/Firestone to Devlin
was to support its decision to bind the putative class members without
giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard.214 Finally, the court
rejected the contention that putative class members have a right to opt
out because the purpose of that protection is to allow class members to
proceed with individual actions, a right they still have after class
certification is denied.215

Id. The Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that one of the underlying claims was based on
RICO, which authorizes nationwide service of process even over those who were not
defendants. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (b) (2000)). Congressional grant allowing for
nationwide service of process may be one way to get jurisdiction over putative class
members after the denial of class certification in federal court. See Miller & Crump, supra
note 82, at 30 (citing United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878)) (stating
that nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from passing laws giving federal
district courts the power to issue nationwide service of process). Rule 4 generally sets the
limit on the jurisdictional reach of federal district courts. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
However, there is an exception when there is a congressional enactment authorizing
nationwide service of process. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D). This enactment would create the
potential for personal jurisdiction over the putative class members, eliminating the need to
rely on the Shutts doctrine because there would be no need to imply consent. See supra Part
II.B.2 for a discussion of the Shutts doctrine.
210
See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768.
211
Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
212
Id. (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002)); see infra Part IV.B.3, which argues
that class certification proceedings are not sufficiently analogous to any instance in which
absent class members have been treated as parties to justify binding them to a denial of
class certification in the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard; see also supra
notes 142-55 and accompanying text discussing the Devlin decision.
213
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69.
214
See id. For a discussion of how this reasoning is flawed, see infra Part IV.B.3.
215
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769. The court noted:
209
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The Bridgestone/Firestone court also created a circuit split by holding
that this situation fits within the relitigation exception to the AntiInjunction Act.216 The court stated that a final judgment, for the purpose
of collateral estoppel, need only be an adjudication of an issue that is
“sufficiently firm.”217 The decision to deny the certification of a
nationwide class was then considered sufficiently firm for the purpose of
fitting within the exception because it received full attention in both the
district court and appellate court, and certiorari was sought.218
The reasoning employed by the Seventh Circuit differs sharply from
that of the Third Circuit.219 Although there are advantages to both lines
of thinking, neither creates an efficient class certification system while
affording putative class members due process.220 As will be shown in
Part IV, enjoining the putative class is an appropriate way to deal with
the problems associated with repeated certification attempts, but due
process requires that the putative class members be afforded notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.221
IV. CREATING AN EFFICIENT CLASS CERTIFICATION SYSTEM WHILE
AFFORDING DUE PROCESS
The Third Circuit was rigid in its adherence to Shutts when it
required that there be a right to opt out in order to gain power over
putative class members.222 The court ruled that because no class was
pending, there would be no chance to opt out and no way for the court
to infer consent.223 Further, it declared that the putative class members
could not be considered parties to the action because they were not
[N]o statute or Rule requires notice, and an opportunity to opt out,
before the certification decision is made; it is a post-certification step.
No one is entitled to opt out of the certification, a decision necessarily
made on a classwide, all-or-none basis; one opts out of a certified class.
And a person who opts out receives the right to go it alone, not to
launch a competing class action.
Id.; see Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 363-67
(7th Cir. 1987).
216
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 13 (1980)).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Compare GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998), with Bridgestone/Firestone, 333
F.3d at 766-67.
220
See infra Part IV.A-B.
221
See infra Part IV.B.
222
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141.
223
Id.
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before the court.224 Therefore, the court held that there was no basis for
power over the putative class in order to bind them to the class
certification decision and enjoin them from repeated certification
attempts.225
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit melded two doctrines
together to find constitutional power to bind the putative class.226 The
court held that due process required only adequate representation in
order for there to be power over the putative class members.227 It
buttressed this reasoning by stating that absent class members were
considered parties for the purpose of class certification.228 Although
effective in eliminating repeated certification attempts, this holding did
not offer appropriate due process protection to putative class
members.229
This Part will first discuss the problems surrounding class
certification in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.230 It will then delineate how
neither the approach taken by the Third Circuit nor the Seventh Circuit
has adequately addressed these problems while affording due process.231
Indeed, this Part will show that in order to gain constitutional power to
bind putative class members, there must be pre-certification notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.232 Finally, this
Part will demonstrate how it is inappropriate to analogize the class
certification process to other procedural events for which absent class
members were treated as parties in order to justify failing to give notice
to the putative class.233
A. The Problems Associated with Numerous Certification Attempts
Although multistate Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are essential to an
efficient judicial system, they create many problems at the certification

Id.
Id.
226
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003).
227
Id. at 769 (“Holding the absent class members to the outcome is no more an exercise in
virtual representation than it is to hold them to a decision on the merits.”).
228
Id. at 768.
229
See infra Part IV.B.2.
230
See infra Part IV.A.
231
See infra Part IV.B.
232
See infra Part IV.B.2.
233
See infra Part IV.B.3.
224
225
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stage.234 The most striking is that putative class members that are not
present in an original federal proceeding in which certification is denied
can attempt to certify the class in another jurisdiction.235 The defendant
cannot argue collateral estoppel against these absent class members
because the members would never have a chance to litigate the
certification issue in the first proceeding.236 Consequently, there can be
as many attempts to certify the same class under Rule 23(b)(3) as there
are willing plaintiffs and proper forums.237 By allowing potential class
representatives endless “bites at the apple,” the probability that classes
will be certified increases greatly.238 The Seventh Circuit envisioned nine
out of ten judges denying class certification, with the tenth judge
rendering the other nine decisions meaningless.239
Repeated attempts to certify Rule 23(b)(3) classes also waste the
resources of defendants by forcing them to spend money on attorney’s
fees and costs for litigating the same issue repeatedly.240 Finality is
mythical in such a system, and the decisions of federal courts are often

See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Kan. 1984). Although
some have argued against multistate class actions generally, these actions allow for an
economical use of judicial resources. Id. Further, it can be problematic to find plaintiffs
willing to bring statewide actions in all appropriate states before the statute of limitations
period has ended. Id.
235
See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding no power to bind the
putative class members to the federal court’s declaration that the class was untenable, thus
allowing for attempts to certify the same class in any state court with proper jurisdiction);
In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that there is
nothing in Rule 23 that prevents the relitigation of the class certification issue in another
forum).
236
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). However, if it is the same
plaintiff in both actions, then collateral estoppel may be pled. See id. However, there still
would be the inconvenience and expense of having to go to multiple courts to litigate.
237
See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 767
Even if just one judge in ten believes that a nationwide class is lawful,
then if the plaintiffs file in ten different states the probability that at
least one will certify a nationwide class is 65% (0.910 = 0.349). Filing in
20 states produces an 88% probability of national class certification
(0.920 = 0.122).
Id.
240
Boyle, supra note 172, at 38. It may be fair to require these defendants to litigate in
multiple courts because there would be traditional personal jurisdiction over the
defendants in each forum so as not to “offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
234
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rendered meaningless.241 Plaintiffs are able to coerce settlements from
defendants, even in the presence of only weak claims, because
defendants fear that a class will be certified given enough attempts.242
Although eliminating multiple attempts to certify Rule 23(b)(3)
classes would put the fate of an entire class into the hands of a single
judge, that is the basis for our legal system—a single judge decides a case
and the parties have a chance to appeal.243 The Seventh Circuit believed
that one federal judge was competent to decide whether a class was
tenable.244 It also believed that allowing only one certification attempt in
Rule 23(b)(3) actions would still provide an opportunity for full litigation
of the issue, which was assured by the chance to appeal a denial of
certification all the way to the Supreme Court.245
The Seventh Circuit attempted to streamline the certification process
when it used its power under the All Writs Act to enjoin the putative
class members and their attorneys from attempting to certify the same
class it found untenable in a different forum.246 However, in doing so
the Seventh Circuit did not afford due process.247
B. Creating a More Effective Class Certification System While Affording Due
Process
The Third Circuit failed to address the problems related to multiple
certification attempts due in part to its rigid application of the Shutts
implied consent doctrine.248 Later, the Seventh Circuit exercised power
241
This Note argues in Part IV.B.2 and Part V that giving notice and the opportunity to
be heard to putative class members during the certification process would increase the
effectiveness with which such proceedings are conducted.
242
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995). Judge
Posner states that the threat of class certification can act as blackmail, causing defendants to
settle. Id. It has also been noted that the amendment to Rule 23, creating a right to appeal
class certification decisions was due in part to concern over this excessive pressure.
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1357, 1358 (2003). However, there is also evidence that settlements in class actions are
generally “below even the level of compensatory damages alleged by the plaintiffs.” John
C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 225-26 (1983).
243
Rule 23 now allows the federal appeals courts to grant an interlocutory appeal of a
class certification decision. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (enacted in 1998, the year the Third Circuit
decided GM Trucks II); see supra Part III.A for a discussion of the Third Circuit’s opinion.
244
See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69.
245
See id.
246
See id. at 769.
247
See infra Part IV.B.2.
248
See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998); see also infra Part IV.B.1.
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over a putative class in an attempt to provide a more workable class
certification format.249 In doing so, it based its power over the putative
class members on a combination of the two following doctrines: the
requirement of adequate representation and treating absent class
members as parties for procedural events.250 This reasoning was
inappropriate because notice, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate
representation must be present in order to gain constitutional power to
bind putative class members.251
1.

Setting the Bar Too High—The Right to Opt Out Should Not Be
Required

Clearly, in the absence of minimum contacts with the forum state,
there is no traditional personal jurisdiction over putative class members
such that binding them to the class certification decision would be
consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”252 However, the Shutts Court held that absent members of
certified classes can be bound to a decision in the absence of minimum
contacts.253 By affording the opportunity to opt out of a class, a
protection that was first given to absent class members in federal courts
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2),254 the Shutts Court
was able to infer the consent of the absent classmembers to be bound by
the judgment.255
The Third Circuit held that because the putative class members were
not parties to the proceedings, their consent must be inferred in order for
a court to have power to bind them to the certification decision.256 This
consent, in the absence of a voluntary appearance in court, could only be
inferred from the refusal to opt out of the class after notice and the

See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765-69.
See infra Part IV.B.2-3.
251
See infra Part IV.B.2.
252
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text for a brief
discussion of the decisions that have shaped the minimum contacts test.
253
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
254
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). For a discussion of the provisions and recent Amendment of
Rule 23, see supra Part II.B.1.
255
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-81 (1984)
(noting that anyone can consent to jurisdiction in any forum).
256
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
249
250
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chance to opt out had been given.257 However, in so holding, the court
misinterpreted the rationale behind inferring consent.258
This Note is not suggesting that the Supreme Court rethink its
implied consent doctrine. After certification, consent must be inferred;
thus, a right to opt out must be given.259 However, Shutts required
consent because it was depriving the absent class members of their
“chose in action,” which is a constitutionally protected property right.260
When a motion for class certification is denied, the putative class
members still have the right to bring an individual action. 261 Although
one could argue that the ability to be a class representative is analogous
to having a chose in action, if a federal court determines that a class is
untenable, this right to be a representative becomes meaningless because
there is no certifiable class to represent.262 However, there is no similar
justification for failing to provide the other due process protections
mandated by Shutts.263

257
Id. (“[T]here is no class pending . . . and thus, virtually none of the 5.7 million [absent,
potential] class members . . . are before this Court in any respect, and there is no basis upon
which we can infer their consent.”); cf. Coffee, supra note 188, at 35.
258
Notably, the Third Circuit stated in dicta that it would likely have power to bind those
over whom it had traditional personal jurisdiction, including the named parties and those
with minimum contacts with the forum state. GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141 n.2.; see supra
notes 185-88.
259
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12.
260
Id. at 807; see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Pennell,
supra note 95, at 483 (defining “chose in action”).
261
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003); see Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807
(citing Mullane, 339 U.S., at 306 for the proposition that “a chose in action is a
constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs”).
262
The Supreme Court may hold that there is a need to infer consent to gain power over
putative class members and bind them to a certification denial. However, until such a
holding is put forth, which appears unlikely, courts must use the standard given in Shutts.
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807, 811-12 (stating that an opt out right is needed to infer consent
when one is going to lose a chose in action). Because a chose in action is by definition a
right to recover damages, and putative class members still have this right after a denial of
class certification, Shutts is distinguishable from the case at hand regarding the issue of
implied consent. See id. One plausible argument for extending the opt out right is that if
the claims of the class members are small enough, they will never have their day in court.
However, this is unpersuasive because it is not the best way to balance the due process
rights of the putative class with the judiciary’s interest in an effective and efficient
certification process. Instead, this Note suggests that offering notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and adequate representation during the certification proceedings, followed by
binding the putative class to the decision of the court, is a better solution. See infra Part V.
263
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
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Finding the Appropriate Balance—Adequate Representation, Notice,
and a Right to Be Heard Must Be Provided

An examination of both Shutts and Rule 23 lead to the same
conclusion: In order to have constitutional power to bind the putative
class, there must be adequate representation, notice, and an opportunity
to be heard.264 The Third Circuit realized this but went too far in
requiring the right to opt out of the class.265 The Seventh Circuit
dispatched with the need for a right to opt out but only required
adequate representation.266 Both courts missed the mark. There is no
justification for failing to give notice and an opportunity to be heard
before binding putative class members to a decision.267
Adequate representation is essential to gaining power over putative
class members; it is the most important due process protection involved
in class action proceedings.268 However, without notice the protection of
adequate representation is diminished greatly because the class cannot
effectively monitor the proceedings.269 One commentator eloquently
stated that those in the best position to determine the adequacy of
representation are those being represented.270

See supra Part II.B.1-2 for a discussion of Rule 23 and the Shutts doctrine.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
266
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769 (“Yet no statute or rule requires notice, and an
opportunity to opt out, before the certification decision is made; it is a post-certification
step.”); see Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 230 N.Y. L.J. 5, 6 (2003)
(noting that if defense attorneys want to use this reasoning, it may be wise not to challenge
the adequacy of representation during the initial certification proceedings).
267
See infra notes 268-81 and accompanying text.
268
See State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1012 (Vt. 2003) (“It is often labeled
the most important of due process requirements.”); Bassett, supra note 44, at 49
(“[A]dequate representation remains the absolute baseline of due process in class
actions.”). Even the Seventh Circuit required a showing of adequate representation before
finding power over putative class members. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769
(noting that no one had challenged adequacy in the trial court or on appeal, and thus it was
assuming there was adequate representation). However, the traditional conception of
adequate representation does not apply directly to certification proceedings because courts
generally determine whether the class representative and the class counsel will be adequate
to represent the interests of the class after certification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring
that, in order to certify a class, the class representative must be able to adequately represent
the interests of the class throughout the course of the litigation); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B)
(requiring that if an attorney is appointed class counsel, he must at all times adequately
represent the class).
269
See Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 11-12.
270
See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1435 (noting that those in the best position to
determine the adequacy of the representation are the class members themselves).
264
265
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Functionally, if notice were given to putative class members,
adequacy of representation would be monitored as follows. After
receiving notice, members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes would first have the
right to enter an appearance in the litigation.271 After entering an
appearance, they could receive copies of all the pleadings and notice of
all hearings.272 This would allow members to determine if intervention is
warranted.273 If they could successfully challenge the adequacy of
representation right away, either the class would not be certified, the
putative class member challenging the representation would become the
new representative, or the challenger would be able to intervene as of
right.274
If there were an unsuccessful attempt to contest the
representation immediately, the class member could seek permissive
intervention in order to represent his own interests.275 However, just by
being involved in the class certification process, the class member would
be able to influence the determination of whether the other factors for
class certification are met and what decisions are made by the
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (providing that absent class members must be given
notice and informed “that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the
member so desires”); Kaplan, supra note 132, at 392 (stating that courts have interpreted
this rule, formerly Rule 23(c)(2)(C), to allow for this type of limited participation in order to
provide a basis on which to decide whether or not to intervene).
272
See, e.g., Ramsey v. Arata, 406 F. Supp. 435, 442 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (interpreting Rule
23(c)(2)(C), which is now Rule 23(c)(2)(B) after the 2003 Amendment).
273
See id.
274
Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1439. Rule 24(a) allows for intervention as of right
if there is inadequate representation. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)). Some have argued
that there should be an absolute right to intervene in class actions without a showing of
inadequate representation, which is currently required under Rule 24(a). See Woolley,
supra note 103, at 580, 607 (arguing that this right should only be tempered by an exception
in extreme cases where manageability becomes a problem); Cohn, supra note 133, at 1223-24
(arguing for a right to intervene with limitations on the activities of intervenors); see also
supra notes 130-33 for a discussion of intervention and the right to be heard in class actions.
Because the purpose of intervention is partly to monitor representation, there should not be
a need to show that the representation needs to be replaced in order to intervene. Woolley,
supra note 103, at 607. Although creating a right to intervene could lead to problems of
manageability, it is unlikely to do so because of the cost of intervention. See Willging, supra
note 1, at 139 (noting that in one study of four federal district courts, there were attempts to
intervene in only 11%, 9%, 5%, and 0% of the cases in each district, respectively).
Substantial attorney fees, which will not normally be recoverable from the class funds in
the absence of inadequate representation, and other hardships will keep class members
from intervening. Woolley, supra note 103, at 608-609.
275
Woolley, supra note 103, at 605-06; see FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (allowing for permissive
intervention even in the absence of inadequate representation). Fiss and Bronsteen argue
that intervention should be a qualified right in class actions. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note
70, at 1441. For example, if there are hundreds of intervention requests, some could be
rejected without diminishing the watchdog nature of intervention and thus would not
cause the litigation to get out of control. Id.
271
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representative.276 Additionally, an intervening class member would be
considered a party who is able to petition a court of appeals for review of
the certification decision under Rule 23(f).277 If notice were not required
before certification, those who would otherwise be involved in the
litigation would not know about it.
In class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members
must generally be afforded “the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort.”278 The requirement of individual
notice is based on the idea that courts must infer consent in order for
there to be power to bind absent class members to a judgment.279
However, if the need to infer consent is not necessary before certification,
there is no need to require individual notice.280 Rather, a discretionary
scheme, allowing the best notice practicable at all times, could be used
for pre-certification notice.281
3.

Treating Putative Class Members as Parties to Procedural Events to
Justify Withholding Notice Is Not Appropriate

The Third Circuit held that putative class members were not
parties.282 Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Devlin, which
posited a flexible approach, based on the goals of class action litigation,
See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1441; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt. (d)(2)
(“[N]otice may encourage interventions to improve the representation of the class.”);
Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
277
Rule 23(f) took effect in 1998, the same year as the Third Circuit decided GM Trucks II.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
278
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
279
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
280
See supra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of how implied consent is irrelevant before
certification of a class.
281
Courts should consider various factors in determining what notice is proper,
including cost of notice, which will vary depending on the size of class and the means
available. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1438. Another factor is the importance of
reaching every member; small claims without a realistic chance of an individual action
being brought create the situation in which it is not that important that individual notice be
given, whereas if there were large claims with great differences in the amount of damages,
individual notice would probably be the best notice practicable. Id. An additional factor
would be the interest in the private enforcement of public laws. Id.
282
GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141. In discussing whether there was power to enjoin
putative class members from trying to certify the same nationwide class in a Louisiana
state court, the court stated: “To be more precise, the Louisiana class members are not parties
before us; they have not constructively or affirmatively consented to personal jurisdiction;
and they do not, as far as has been demonstrated, have minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania.” Id. (emphasis added).
276
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to determine whether absent class members should be considered parties
to a procedural event.283 The Seventh Circuit used the Devlin decision as
support for treating putative class members as parties to the certification
proceedings and binding them to a certification decision without notice
or an opportunity to be heard.284
Normally in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, class members are not
considered parties and are not bound by a judgment unless they receive
notice and refuse to exercise a right to opt out of the class.285 However,
in light of Devlin, the inquiry becomes whether the goals of class action
litigation support finding that putative class members are parties to the
certification proceedings.286 Here it is instructive to look at past
instances in which absent class members were treated as parties.287
The Seventh Circuit tried to equate certification proceedings to the
facts of Devlin by stating that the putative class members had the right to
seek certiorari after its decision.288 In Devlin, the Court held that absent
class members were parties to the litigation for the purpose of appealing
an overruled objection made at a settlement fairness hearing.289 The
Court considered two factors in its determination: (1) the fact that the
objector had interests divergent from the class representative, as shown
through objecting at the settlement fairness hearing, and (2) the binding
effect of the judgment on the objector.290
The Seventh Circuit’s analogy to Devlin was inappropriate for a
number of reasons. First and most striking, Devlin involved a certified
class in which the class members had received notice of the proposed

See Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 143, at 336 (quoting Devlin v.
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2002)).
284
See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003). Although the
court was careful to use the phrase “class member” throughout its opinion when referring
to putative class members, it did slip once when it stated that “any would-be member of
the class could have sought certiorari from our adverse decision.” Id. at 768.
285
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (stating that Rule 23(b)(3) class members are bound by the
judgment if notice and an opportunity to opt out are given); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
286
See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6.
287
See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the history of treating absent class members as
parties for procedural events.
288
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768 (citing Devlin, 531 U.S. at 14). Rule 23(f) allows
the appeals court power to grant an appeal of the class certification decision if the request is
made within ten days of the decision. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
289
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 14; cf. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 143, at 332.
290
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
283
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settlement.291 The dissent in Devlin aptly stated that “[n]ot even
petitioner . . . [was] willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous
argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the class-action
litigation before the class is certified.”292 Second, the class members in
Devlin had to object at the fairness hearing, so they had initiated some
action to bring themselves before the court.293 The Seventh Circuit was
dealing with putative class members that had not taken any affirmative
steps to bring themselves before the court.294 Third, the Devlin Court was
attempting to keep class members in the class action litigation, and the
Seventh Circuit was attempting to keep class members out of the
litigation.295 Finally, Devlin required a binding effect on a class member
in order to be considered a party.296 However, the Seventh Circuit
considered the putative class members parties that could be bound by a
judgment.297 Thus, in order to make Devlin applicable to certification
attempts, the Seventh Circuit would have to use its holding
retroactively.298
The only time putative class members have been bound as parties for
purposes similar to the class certification issue is for purposes of the
tolling rule.299 If any member of the putative class files an action seeking
class treatment, putative class members receive the benefit of a tolled
statute of limitations from the time the action is filed until the denial of
certification.300 Tolling the statute of limitations does not itself involve
litigating anything per se; it just allows the putative class members to
receive the benefit.301 However, the denial of class certification, by
definition, involves litigation. Thus, notice would not help to more
effectively toll the statute of limitations, but notice would definitely
provide for better litigation of the certification issue and proper
monitoring of the representation.302

Compare Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6, with Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69.
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 16 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293
Id. at 5; see supra notes 138-40 for a discussion of how the federal rules contemplate
active participation to receive party status.
294
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768.
295
Compare Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6, with Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69.
296
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
297
Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768.
298
See id.
299
See supra Part II.C.
300
See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
301
See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
302
See supra Part II.B.3.
291
292
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As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there are no procedural
events in which absent class members have been treated as parties that
are sufficiently analogous to class certification proceedings to justify
treating putative class members as parties to such proceedings.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s use of this doctrine to justify its refusal
to give notice was improper.303 Consequently, there is no justification for
binding putative class members without providing notice.304 Courts can
only gain power to bind putative class members by offering notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.305
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 23
As was discussed in Part IV, allowing numerous certification
attempts by absent class members often renders federal decisions
meaningless because any state court judge can certify a nationwide class
similar to one rejected by a federal court.306 Defendants are left uncertain
about the validity of a federal decision and rush into settlements
needlessly.307 In addition, repeated litigation of the same issue wastes a
tremendous amount of judicial resources.308
Part IV also showed how no court has provided an adequate
solution to these problems while affording due process.309 Further, the
recent amendment to Rule 23 also did not address these issues, even
though it was amended in December 2003.310 Consequently, this Note
suggests another amendment to Rule 23, one which incorporates the
right to injunctive relief against relitigation of the certification issue in
other jurisdictions and affords the due process protections of notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation to the putative
class. This scheme will allow federal courts to prevent undue repetition
of the certification issue while having constitutional power over the
putative class.
Courts should be given wide discretion to fashion the best notice
practicable under the circumstances before certification, without being
required to give individual notice. Individual notice should only be
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310

See supra Part IV.B.3.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.
See supra note 69 for a discussion of the 2003 Amendment to Rule 23.
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required after certification because its purpose is to allow for consent to
be inferred from the absent members of certified classes.
Precertification notice has the purpose of allowing an opportunity to be
heard as a way to monitor the class representation. This goal can be
accomplished without requiring individual notice.
Additionally,
because seeking an injunction puts the defendant in the position of a
plaintiff seeking relief, the court should have discretion to force a
defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for the notice costs if an injunction is
granted.
This proposed amendment to Rule 23(c) effectively balances the
interests involved. It protects the putative class members’ due process
rights and their interests in effectively monitoring the class
representation. It also satisfies the defendants’ interests in finality and
cost reduction. Finally, it allows for judicial economy and attempts to
ensure that no federal court decisions will be rendered meaningless.
Proposed Amendment to Rule 23(c)311
(c) Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class
Action; Appointing Class Counsel; Notice and
Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple Classes and
Subclasses.
(1)(A) When a person sues or is sued as a representative
of a class, the court must--at an early practicable time-determine by order whether to certify the action as a
class action.
(B) An order certifying a class action must define the
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must
appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g).
(C) An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or
amended before final judgment.
(2)(A) For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2),
the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.

311
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. See
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (amended December 1, 2003); Part II.B.1 (discussing
provisions of the current Rule 23).
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(B) Upon a motion to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the
court must direct to the putative class members the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, and if the
class is certified there must be individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. Notice, whether given before or after certification,
must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily
understood language:
• the nature of the action,
• the definition of the purported class or certified class,
• the class claims, issues, or defenses,
• that a class member of a certified or putative class may
enter an appearance through counsel if the member so
desires
• that the court will exclude from the certified class any
member who requests exclusion, stating when and how
members may elect to be excluded, and
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class
members under Rule 23(c)(3) or in the event that the court
grants an injunction under Rule 23(c)(2)(C).
(C) Once pre-certification notice has been given, and a
motion to certify a class under Rule 23 (b)(3) has been
denied, the court may enjoin the entire putative class
from attempting to certify the same or a substantially
similar multistate class in a different forum upon motion
of any party.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and
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who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court
finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
Proposed Official Comments:312
Note to Subdivision (c)(2)(B)
Pre-Certification Notice
Courts are now required to give notice to the members
of putative classes before the certification decision is
made when the plaintiff is seeking certification under
Rule 23(b)(3). This notice will allow for all putative class
members to have the opportunity to enter an appearance
and intervene if appropriate.
The “best notice practicable under the circumstances”
standard is retained, but there is no requirement of
individual notice prior to certification even if it would be
reasonable under the circumstances. Courts must be
given wide latitude to fashion notice to meet the best
practicable standard, which could include individual
notice. In determining what constitutes the best notice
practicable, courts must look to a number of factors
including, but not limited to, the following: the cost of
notice, the size of the claims, and the possibility of
individual actions being pursued.
The rule that plaintiffs pay the cost of notice has not
been changed by this Amendment. However, if a
defendant seeks an injunction under Rule 23(c)(2)(C),
they are in essence a plaintiff seeking relief from the
court.
Thus, courts may condition granting an

312
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injunction on the defendant reimbursing the class
plaintiff for the costs of notice paid.

Right to Request Exclusion
This rule does not require the right to request exclusion
from the class certification proceeding in order to be
bound to the certification decision because there is no
need to infer consent, as no chose in action will be lost.
By definition, the putative class members retain their
right to bring individual actions after certification of a
class is denied.
However, if a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the
court must afford the right to opt out of the class in
order to bind class members to a judgment. As such,
courts must require reasonable individual notice after
certification. It is contemplated that the aggregate cost
of notice given before and after certification will be
comparable to notice given only after certification under
the previous rule.
Additionally, the problems created for putative class
members in the absence of a right to opt out of the class
certification proceedings are de minimus. In three of the
four possible scenarios, the putative class member
would experience no problem when faced with no right
to opt out of the class certification proceeding. First, if
the class is certified, the right to opt out will still be
given. Second, someone who would choose not to opt
out of the certification proceedings would not be
adversely affected by the lack of a right to opt out of the
class. Third, if someone wanted to opt out and pursue
an individual action, he could still do so because no
chose in action is lost when certification is denied. The
fourth scenario raises more issues. If someone wanted
to opt out of the class certification proceedings and
attempt to certify the class in another forum, he would
be foreclosed from doing so by an injunction authorized
under Rule 23(c)(2)(C). The loss of this person’s right to
attempt to certify the class is one of the trade-offs of a
more
efficient
class
certification
procedure.
Additionally, this problem is moderated by allowing
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notice, a right to enter an appearance, and potentially to
intervene. This will allow those that want to be involved
in the class certification proceedings an opportunity to
do so.
Note to Subdivision (c)(2)(C)
Power to Enjoin
The injunctive power given to courts under this rule is in
addition to that offered by the All Writs Act.313 This rule
allows courts to enjoin the entire putative class from
attempting to certify the same or a substantially similar
class in another forum after certification is denied. This
injunctive power is intended to work in connection with
the rights to receive notice and to intervene, which are
given to the class members in order to provide the most
effective litigation of the class certification issue. This
rule creates an exception to the general rule that the
subsequent forum determines the preclusive effect of a
judgment.314 This is due in large part to the problems
associated with multistate class actions, in which there is
the realistic possibility of repeated litigation on the same
issue in numerous courts.
These proposed amendments to Rule 23(c) would allow for a fully
litigated class certification decision made by a federal court to be given
effect while still affording due process to all concerned. It would also
solve many of the problems raised in the hypothetical described in Part I.
As described in the Introduction, StarBrothers, Inc. was sued by Albert in
a products liability action in federal court based on his injuries caused by
a defective table saw. Albert attempted to certify the class under Rule
23(b)(3), but the class was found untenable. Subsequently, an absent
class member attempted to certify the same class in a state court in a
different jurisdiction. StarBrothers was unable to argue collateral
estoppel because the absent class member was not a party to the original
federal court proceedings. Consequently, StarBrothers was faced with
litigating the certification issue again. Further, the absent class member

313
314
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could not have participated in the original federal proceeding, even if he
wanted to, because he did not receive notice.
If the proposed rule were in effect and notice, the opportunity to be
heard, and adequate representation were given before the certification
decision was made in the federal court, the court would have had power
to bind the putative class to the certification decision. StarBrothers could
then move the federal court to enjoin further certification attempts by
anyone in the putative class.
This injunction would prevent
StarBrothers’ from having to litigate the same issue multiple times and
would further the goal of judicial economy. In addition, although the
cost of notice would have been paid by Albert, the original class plaintiff,
the court could require StarBrothers to reimburse Albert for the notice
costs before issuing the injunction.
If the proposed rule were in effect, Albert likely would have received
pre-certification notice of the federal proceedings and would have had a
right to enter an appearance and possibly intervene. Even if the federal
court did not require individual notice and Albert did not actually
receive notice, it is safe to say that enough absent class members would
have received notice and participated in the action so that there would
have been adequate monitoring of the representation to protect Albert’s
interests.
As with any complex problem, there are limitations to this proposed
solution. The Anti-Injunction Act may bar the injunctive power granted
by this proposed rule if the state court proceeding had begun prior to the
federal court’s certification decision, and the Third Circuit’s approach to
applying the relitigation exception would then be applicable.315
However, in any case in which an absent class member brings a
subsequent action to certify a class, the injunctive power given by this
proposed rule will have full force. In addition, if the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act is applied, the rule will almost
always have full force.316
This proposed rule relates to attempts to certify classes under Rule
23(b)(3) and does not discuss (b)(1) or (b)(2) class actions.317 However,
this Note does recognize that plaintiffs’ pleadings may contain
315
See supra notes 189-94, 216-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the AntiInjunction Act and the current split on whether the class certification decision should fall
within the relitigation exception to the Act.
316
See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
317
See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 23(b).
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allegations that a putative class fits into more than one class or that the
class may be denied for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).318
This proposed rule is intended to address situations in which it is pled
that the class is certifiable under Rule 23(b)(3). It properly balances the
interests of putative class members, potential defendants, and the
judiciary. It gives credence to potential federal court decisions where the
Third Circuit’s approach would not, while affording putative class
members due process where the Seventh Circuit’s approach would
not.319
VI. CONCLUSION
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is a complex issue that raises
difficult problems, especially regarding the rights of absent class
members. The issue becomes even fuzzier when dealing with the rights
of putative class members after certification is denied. Clearly, allowing
members of a putative class numerous attempts to litigate the class
certification issue after a federal court has found the class untenable is
problematic. It unduly taxes defendants and the judicial system.
This Note proposes a more workable certification procedure that
would allow federal courts to grant injunctions that prevent putative
class members from attempting to certify the same or a substantially
similar class in a different forum after the federal court has denied
certification. The Seventh Circuit used this approach, but it did not
afford due process to the people it was enjoining. It relied merely on the
adequacy of representation to gain power over the putative class.
Traditionally, in order to bind absent class members of a Rule
23(b)(3) class, a court must afford the class due process by giving them
notice, an opportunity to be heard, adequate representation, and the
right to opt out of the class. When the Third Circuit applied this test to
putative class members, it unnecessarily required the right to opt out
because, in its rigid adherence to the Shutts doctrine, it reasoned that it
needed to infer consent from the putative class members. However, this
was not necessary because their chose in action remains intact after
certification is denied.

See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 23(a).
See supra Part III for a description of the different approaches taken by these circuit
courts to the problems surrounding numerous certification attempts.
318
319
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The approach suggested by this Note is that Rule 23(c) should be
amended to allow federal courts power to enjoin the putative class after
they are given the best notice practicable, an opportunity to be heard,
and adequate representation. Because the purpose of pre-certification
notice is not to infer consent, but rather to provide a check on the
adequacy of representation, individual notice need not be required.
Additionally, because the defendant steps into the shoes of the plaintiff
when asking for the equitable remedy of an injunction, courts must have
discretion to force defendants to reimburse class plaintiffs for the costs of
notice paid if an injunction is issued. These changes to Rule 23(c)
provide a workable solution to the problems presented in the context of
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). The putative class members are
afforded due process, the burdens on defendants are reduced, and the
judiciary’s interests in economy and finality are satisfied.
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